Bylaws Q & A

[oiuyt]

http://usfencing.org/news/article/13915

The Bylaws Review Task Force has recently posted a series of questions and answers covering some of the work they've engaged in during the past season.

They are soliciting feedback, comments, and suggestions via both email (bylaws@usfencing.org) and in person at Summer Nationals. If you are in Dallas this week look for signs announcing times and locations for such discussion meetings.

-B

[PeterGustafsson]

Hi!


Near the bottom of the linked text, I found this excerpt:

2 candidates for each open position nominated by the Nominating Committee; elected at the membership meeting, possibly using a system of cumulative voting

This text describes what the election process for the 4 at-large board members of the USFA Board of Directors.

Unless specified in excruciating detail, I find this a recipe for acrimony. Why? Three reasons:

1. "Possibly" - whatever voting system is used, it must be decided upon well in advance of the election.
2. "a system" - this seems to indicate that Weeks is thinking of cumulative voting as a class of voting systems. Whatever she defines as this class, other people do not yet know which methods she considers as belonging to this class. Without knowing what exactly is meant, all discussion resembles a sabre bout in which there are many blindfolded fencers, all out for themselves only. Lots of action, but not much logic.
3. Cumulative voting has a few drawbacks, in which specific combinations of votes can produce a result which goes against the wishes of majorites of those voters. This is true for all voting systems, but cumulative voting violates the Condorcet criterion, which is especially problematic.

Point#1 is hopefully self-explaining, so I will not go into it more here.

Points #2-3 require some background concerning voting systems in general, cumulative voting in particular. A few links:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cumulative_voting
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_criterion

From the first link I copy this:

Ballots used for cumulative voting differ both in the ways voters mark their selections and in the degree to which voters are permitted to split their own vote. Possibly the simplest ballot uses the equal and even cumulative voting method, where a voter simply checks off preferred candidates, as in bloc voting, and votes are then automatically divided evenly among those preferred candidates. SNIP

A more common and slightly more complex cumulative ballot uses a points method. Under this system, voters are given an explicit number of points (often referred to as "votes" because in all known cases those number of points equals the number of seats to be elected) to distribute amongst candidates on a single ballot.

Here we see two things: firstly, there are more than one voting system which is called cumulative voting, and secondly, many different tweaks can be introduced in order to achieve certain objectives while still having a cumulative voting system.

If one is to use cumulative voting, the USFA leadership should figure out - in detail, expressed as quantifiable goals - which objectives should be met, and from there decide which tweaks should be inserted. This should be an open process, in order to lessen the appearance that sinister things are being done so that some groups is helped and another disenfranchised.

Another thing is that I personally think that there are better voting methods out there when it comes to electing several members with equal standing to a multiseat board/chamber. I am perfectly willing to explain why, and advise the USFA on all of its options when it comes to various voting systems, but unless one sees that other options than cumulative voting are actively considered, I will hold back for the moment.

Finally, point #3. Put simply, the Condorcet criterion states that a voting system should be designed so that a candidate who wins a pairwise comparison over all other candidates should be elected. In a voting system which does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion, one may have the outcome that there are for candidates: A, B, C, and D. A majority of the voters prefer A over B, and likewise with A over C and A over D. Despite this, candidate A does not get elected. If something like this happens, it is quite likely that some votes will say that the election was stolen/rigged/messed up, and the internal fights will really get vicious.

A good consequence of choosing a voting system which is compliant with the Condorcet criterion is that it shapes candidate behavior for the better. Under Condorcet-compliant systems, it becomes rational behavior for a candidate to try to reach out to those voters who are primarily beholden to other candidates, and another thing: negative campaigning will backfire heavily in Condorcet-compliant systems.


Have a nice time!

Peter Gustafsson