The Voting Process

[PeterGustafsson]

Hi!


Finally, USFA members get to appreciate the finer points of voting system theory! If this gets a large group of Americans to understand preferential voting, then that is a major pro.

Oh, and about the hypothetical X X X votes: The by far simplest solution is to declare those votes spoilt, and remove them from consideration entirely. Why should others encumber themselves with trying to account for the wishes of those who can not take the time to read the voting rules, and list 3 preferences?

OTOH, there are voting systems which permits the use of such votes without any problem. If Condorcet voting is used, such ballots can be interpreted that the candidate with an X is preferred over the candidate without, and that the voter´s preference is equal among the X candidates. Condorcet voting takes preference ties into consideration just fine, they just do not affect anything.

There is also Approval voting, in which the voter is asked to separate the candidates into two groups: acceptable and unacceptable. This voting method expressly asks for that kind of ballot, so can treat it perfectly. However, correctly cast 1-2-3 ballots will then be useless. Approval voting also has other drawbacks, see article by Donald Saari for extensive examples.


Have a nice time!

Peter Gustafsson

[PeterGustafsson]

Hi!

Yes, a weighted preferential system does not meet the "majority of votes cast" test.

However there are ways that three people can obtain a majority of the vote cast in a preferential system -- they do it one at a time. Candidates with the smallest number of first preference votes get eliminated and their votes get transfered instant runoff style until a candidate has more than half the vote. Then that candidate is considered elected and removed. All votes return to full value and the process repeated until the required number of candidates are elected. Each candidate had the majority of votes in their runoff and the bylaws are followed.

This is the method is described in Robert's Rules of Order for electing multiple candidates for the same type of office.

I have not read RRoO myself, but I trust you have described its contents well. That said, it calls for repeated Instant Runoff Voting, IRV. I would like to point out some things:

Assume that all, or a great majority, of the voters vote slate-wise, no significant mix-and-matching going on. Assume that the margin between the slates is very small. Then any number of things could happen, but the first seat will go to the slate which has its voters vote most consistently. I will name the slates A and B, since it is not relevant which is which. Assume that the vote tally is like this:
49%: A1, A2, A3
17%: B1, B2, B3
17%: B3, B1, B2
17%: B2, B3, B1

That means that the A slate is slightly less popular, but that its voters vote internally consistent. OTOH, the slightly more common B voters (51% in total) are not voting in unison.

So what would the result be:
A2 and A3 are out directly, since they have no 1st-hand votes. Then, the B candidates are dropped, in reverse order as their 1-hand votes. Let us assume that B3 gets slightly fewer votes and B2, while B1 ekes out a slight win among the B´s. Then, B1 gets 51%, and gets the 1st seat.

For the 2nd seat the vote tally is then:
49%: A1, A2, A3
34%: B2, B3
17%: B3, B2
A2 and A3 are out directly, since they have no 1st-hand votes. Then, B3 is dropped. Then, B2 gets 51%, and gets the 2nd seat.

For the 3rd seat the vote tally is then:
49%: A1, A2, A3
51%: B3
B3 gets 51%, and gets the 3rd seat.

The B slate gets all seats, despite only winning with a wafer-thin margin. This result promotes internal cohesion within the elected group, but is liable to make a lot of members feel excluded and therefore sore losers. Whether that is a good trade-off is for the USFA to decide, there are no voting systems which are good in all circumstances - one has to make up one´s mind about which drawbacks one can suffer best.

Let us assume a slightly different vote tally:
49%: A1, A2, A3
17%: B1, B2, B3
17%: B3, B1, B2
14%: B2, B3, B1
3%: B2, B3, A1

As you see, candidate A1 has made a slight inroad into the B camp in this example. After A2, A3 and B3 have been dropped, we have the following tally:
49%: A1
34%: B1, B2
14%: B2, B1
3%: B2, A1
With 17%, B2 drops out. We have the following tally:

51%: A1
49%: B1
A1 is rewarded for his slight cross-over appeal with the 1st seat.

For the 2nd seat, we have the following tally:
49%: A2, A3
17%: B1, B2, B3
17%: B3, B1, B2
14%: B2, B3, B1
3%: B2, B3,
A3 drops out without any 1-hand votes, and is followed by first B3 and then B2.

Here comes the kicker.

The votes of those 3% are now exhausted, and the revised vote tally becomes:
49%: A2
48%: B1

A2 benefits from A1´s good campaign, and gets the 2nd seat.

For the 3rd seat, the revised vote tally is as follows:
49%: A3
17%: B1, B2, B3
17%: B3, B1, B2
14%: B2, B3, B1
3%: B2, B3

B3 and B2 are dropped in that order. That 3% voter contingent get their votes exhausted again. the vote tally then stands at:
49%: A3
48%: B1,

A3 completes a clean sweep by the A slate.

The comparison between the two scenarios outlined above shows that the minority slate can win it outright, if their voters are disciplined and their top candidate can make a small inroad among opposing voters. If the election committee wishes to take away this quirk, they should ask voters to provide a full listing of preferences 1-6, which prevents votes from being exhausted. However, if A2 had made the same inroad, it would not have done them any good. The comparison also shows that slates are greatly helped if they can get their voters to vote coherently. Both slates should be posting, here or on their websites, in which order they want their supporters to prioritize them.

Assuming that the election is close, both slates have a lot to think about in order to get important 2nd and 3rd preferences by some generally skeptical voters, and figure out ways to do so without angering their base. This will call for some complex electioneering, and I do not think that they can foresee all, or even most, possibilities.

Condorcet voting would have made for a more easily predictable result.


Have a nice time!

Peter Gustafsson

[oiuyt]

The B slate gets all seats, despite only winning with a wafer-thin margin. This result promotes internal cohesion within the elected group

Peter, I have a quick (hopefully!) question about the quoted statement.

By my reading of what you've written, in the first example A-slate supporters were more "internally consistent". Yet the three elected candidates were B1, B2 and B3. How is this an example of promoting internal cohesion?

-B

[ysbadadden]

Is there a reason why, in 2008, the numbers in the table of contents of the 2001 Bylaws don’t correspond to the numbers of the Bylaws themselves? If I were paranoid, I would suspect that this was a deliberate device to prevent ordinary members from reading the Bylaws at all. How is it possible that it hasn’t been corrected during an election where questions of the Bylaws’ contents come prominently into play?

I agree that according to the Bylaws, the prescribed method of voting is the one in Robert’s Rules of Order. But the Bylaws also prescribe that the Election Committee’s ballot “shall be designed to minimize ambiguity.”

A ballot that doesn’t tell me how my votes are to be counted isn’t unambiguous. Peter G. is right: we Americans aren’t much used to the many varieties of preferential voting – especially one that seems neither to ensure that the most popular candidates will be elected nor that at least some minority candidates will be elected. Without knowing how my votes are to be counted, I don't know how to vote. And don't tell me that it was everyone's responsibility to read through the misnumbered Bylaws and look up Robert's before casting a vote.

It seems to me that this wasn’t thought through in 2001 or explained very clearly in 2008.

I’m not pointing a finger at anyone or endorsing any slate here. I’m just APPALLED.

It looks like we have a winner:

Since Roberts describes a specific preferential voting method for electing multiple candidates to the same type of office (for when actual remail runoffs aren't feasible) it looks like the election committee doesn't get to design the system, they merely have to implement it.

And explain it to the candidates and voters

[Philistine]

Here is the voting procedure from Robert's Rules of Order (note that while this would seem to be the most likely rule to follow-and one certainly allowable--I'm not sure it's necessarily required).

WRT ballots marked XXX instead of 123, RRO states:

If a ballot having one or more names not marked with any numeral comes up for placement at any stage of the counting and all of its marked names have been eliminated, it should not be placed in any pile, but should be set aside.

Also on point--RRO explains

When this or any other system of preferential voting is to be used, the voting and counting procedure must be precisely established in advance and should be prescribed in detail in the bylaws of the organization. The members must be thoroughly instructed as to how to mark the ballot, and should have sufficient understanding of the counting process to enable them to have confidence in the method. Sometimes, for instance, voters decline to indicate a second or other choice, mistakenly believing that such a course increases the chances of their first choice. In fact, it may prevent any candidate from receiving a majority and require the voting to be repeated.

(My emphasis).

--Philistine

[PeterGustafsson]

Hi!

Peter, I have a quick (hopefully!) question about the quoted statement.

By my reading of what you've written, in the first example A-slate supporters were more "internally consistent". Yet the three elected candidates were B1, B2 and B3. How is this an example of promoting internal cohesion?

-B

Two things:
1. The example was not made to illustrate that internal cohesion is a great weapon for the slate whose voters can exhibit it. Internal cohesion is very important in plurality voting, less so in many other voting systems (including this one).
2. In my example, 49% of the voters had an A-slate candidate as their #1, while 51% of the voters had an B-slate candidate as their #1. So, the example shows that under this voting system a slight popular majority (slate-wise) can, under some circumstances, translate into a clean sweep of seats.

Time to take on your Karl Rove hat, Brad!


Have a nice time!

Peter Gustafsson

[oiuyt]

Ahhh, I think I see the issue.

When I read

This result promotes internal cohesion within the elected group

I thought you were saying that this was an example where internal cohesion (ie voting discipline) was beneficial, which didn't make sense with the rest of your example.

Whereas what you were actually saying was that it results in an elected group of compatible (read: running together) candidates actually being elected.

Sorry for the confusion.

-B

[PeterGustafsson]

Hi!

A ballot that doesn’t tell me how my votes are to be counted isn’t unambiguous. Peter G. is right: we Americans aren’t much used to the many varieties of preferential voting – especially one that seems neither to ensure that the most popular candidates will be elected nor that at least some minority candidates will be elected. Without knowing how my votes are to be counted, I don't know how to vote. And don't tell me that it was everyone's responsibility to read through the misnumbered Bylaws and look up Robert's before casting a vote.

It seems to me that this wasn’t thought through in 2001 or explained very clearly in 2008.

I’m not pointing a finger at anyone or endorsing any slate here. I’m just APPALLED.

Well, I have been trying to get people interested in other than the dumber-than-dirt plurality voting system. I have met with relatively little success, and this mess follows.

It is not my fault.

That said:
I am not an USFA member, but I am a fencer, an American(*), and - while not a psephologist by training - very strongly interested in the mathematics of voting systems. I am also hoping that USFA rights its ship.

I offer my volunteer services, such as they are, to the incoming USFA leadership, irrespective of whom they may be in choosing a better set of voting systems.

I am fully aware that this may seem that I am quite full of myself, but:
While not a formally trained psephologist, I have studied the field in some detail on my own and I can on the topic of voting systems advise the USFA of pitfalls, find more knowledgeable people than myself, and prepare the topic so that the USFA representative will know which relevant questions to ask.

That said, there is no perfect voting system. They vary in quality, and one must prioritize among the types of drawbacks one wants to avoid the most. (Yes, they all have drawbacks, even in the case where all voters cast unspoilt votes and the tallying is perfect.) Few people outside the field know of which errors to be aware of, and in this I believe that I can be of help to the USFA.

Kalle, write me up on the list.


Yours in Fencing,

Peter Gustafsson

[Swordmaster]

While not a formally trained psephologist,....

That's a good thing because I hear they arrest people for doing that to children in Louisiana....

[IanSerotkin]

...I have a solution!

[PeterGustafsson]

Hi!

That's a good thing because I hear they arrest people for doing that to children in Louisiana....

It is a real word, describing a real science. See for yourself:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psephology

If you think being flippant when USFA is in this fix, then I have but one word:

Sheesh.


Peter Gustafsson

[telkanuru]

I don't know where this should go, but maybe here. Replace "flag" with "equipment".

[Swordmaster]

...I am not an USFA member, but I am a fencer, an American(*),...

So you want to help...but you don't want to be a part of it while you help?

What does the (*) after American actually mean?

If you think being flippant when USFA is in this fix, then I have but one word:...

I was being Flippant with you...not the USFA, which you are not a part of any way...

[PeterGustafsson]

Hi!

So you want to help...but you don't want to be a part of it while you help?

My lack of USFA membership is due to the fact that I live and fence in Sweden. You can see that directly to the left, BTW. I doubt that I even can by a USFA membership from over here.

What does the (*) after American actually mean?

That is the lack of copy reading of my part. I had intended it to denote an explainer, which I then forgot to add. Here it comes:
*I am a dual Swedish-American citizen, both citizenships since birth. The both mean something to me.

I was being Flippant with you...not the USFA, which you are not a part of any way...

Well, if you meant with that flippancy what I assumed - and still assume - that you meant, then I consider your flippancy in extremely poor taste.


Peter Gustafsson

[KD5MDK]

Did you try the online membership form?

[Philistine]

So. Has anyone who sent a request to the Election Committee received a response back as to how they're going to count the votes?

--Philistine

[Inquartata]

My head hurts.

[tchwojko]

My head hurts.

It would seem that counting sometimes has that affect on you.

[KD5MDK]

Only when he reaches 11 and his laces are doubleknotted.

[arc]

My lack of USFA membership is due to the fact that I live and fence in Sweden. You can see that directly to the left, BTW. I doubt that I even can by a USFA membership from over here.

First off, do you really think we would turn down your money?

Second, have you considered what the National Division is for, out of curiosity (i.e., those outside the U.S. or any Division)?

Food for thought ... in theory, as you've indicated you're a US citizen, you shoul be able to get to U.S Nationals from the National Division ... but the Ops Manual, I think, has the details on that ...