Hi!
Yet another thread on voting from me. You have been warned.
In the thread about suggestions from an USFA member on how to modify the USFA charter, he suggests that slate voting should be kept from happening, and that candidates should be considered on their own merits.
That is a legitimate concern, it is perfectly possible that a weak candidate hangs on to the coattail of a otherwise strong slate.
OTOH, with totally individual voting, there is always the risk that the elected group of officials will become unbalanced in one way or another. One region may be heavily over/underrepresented. The same goes for weapon/gender/age, other characteristics which it may be good to have some balance of. Here, I use the word "balance" as meaning that the proportion of those in the the elected group should not be too far away from the comparable proportion among the voting members. With a slate voting system, this can be counteracted.
I propose for your discussion a system which is intended to combine the best parts of both systems, while mostly avoiding the drawbacks. Consider this method:
1. For each charateristic (region/weapon/athlete status/gender/etc) minimum, and in some cases maximum, quotas are set. The quota is defined as a percentage of the elected group which has some charracteristic. The span between minimum and maximum permissible quota should be sufficiently large so that steps #2-9 can be carried out.
2. All who wish to run for election must state so, publicly, to the body in charge of electoral count. This should be done well in advance of the election, at least 6 months. The contenders state which posts they can consider running for, but they are
not permitted to state whom they want to run with. They must also state which quota-specified characteristics they possess.
3. The electoral body publishes all information about the candidates obtained in step 3. This should be done at the very latest one month after the candidacy deadline, so at least 5 months before election.
4. All interested members are allowed to submit slates to the electoral body. Members are allowed to submit multiple slates, if the so wish.
5. The slates which fulfill all maximum and minimum quotas are suggested for popular election by the electoral body.
6. If a candidate finds that he is put up on a slate together with other candidates that he does not wish to be elected with, his only recourse is to step down from all candidacy. If that happens, all slates containing his name are stricken from the election list.
7. All slates surviving step 6 are put up for popular election. The names for the slate submitter is not divulged by the electoral body.
8. Members vote by stating their preferences for the different slates, 1 denoting the slate that they like the best, 2 denoting the 2nd best, and so on.
9. Should there be no slate which gets more than 50% of all the votes for best slate, the electoral body will proceed to find the best candidate by striking from contention the slate which got the fewest #1 votes. The votes for that slate are then transferred to whichever slate that the individual voter stated was his 2nd best choice. The votes are then recounted to find if any slate passes the 50% limit. Should this not produce a winning slate, the procedure is repeated sufficient times.
This voting method, Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) can be proved to always produce a winner. It is used by the IOC to determine which city shall host the games. Provided that the voting group is numerous and not intimately known on an individual basis by the candidate, it can be shown that IRV punishes negative campaigning, and rewards reach-out initiatives. It often produces relatively centrist election winners. There are no wasted votes, you can vote for your best choice as #1 and if it fails, you can have the the best to your liking of the popular choices as #2.
With this proposed system, grossly unbalanced elected groups would not win. People who only want yes-sayers around them will likely fall off at step #6. Widely popular candidates, and those who are very good for a specific post, will appear on many slates, and will therefore have a very good chance of getting voting. The system allows for negative campaigning, but it is unlikely to be of any use, and is very likely to be counterproductive. "Stealth candidates" will not pass step #2.
Apart from being more work-intensive than the present system (of an electoral committee putting up a slate which is accepted as a whole, unless an election is specifically called for) do you see any drawbacks compared to the present system? Any other comments?
I find it interesting that the suggestion from the chicago guy includes a big quota on people with a specific education, but no safeguards against inbalance in regard to other characteristics.
Have a nice time!
Peter Gustafsson