Military Blunders

[arcon]

[ 10-19-2001: Message edited by: arcon ]

[Rick]

This one is also related to Hitler...
On the morning of Operation Overlord, the German army woke up to see the largest beach invasion in history along the shores of Normandy, France.
News was sent to Berlin to inform the Axis high command of the Allied invasion. However, Hitler's generals opted to let Der Fuhrer sleep-in rather than awaken him with the news. Incidentally, Field Marshall Rommel (nicknamed 'Desert Fox' by the British), called in from the African Front to overlook the German defenses on France's Coastline, was en-route back to Berlin during the invasion -- summoned by Hitler.
The fall of Berlin had already begun.

[Mergs]

Arcon are you baiting me to get into another military history thread? Dammit, you succeeded!

Tactically, and strategically, the Japanese blew it at Pearl Harbor, BIG TIME.

Right strategic target, wrong tactical ones.

Pearl was the only base that could support operations in the Pacific. So they go after land-based aircraft (yes, they had too in order to eliminate the counter-air threat, but the B-17's?) and the heavy capital ships (all obsolete WWI/Post WWI battleships that were never any use except as gun platforms to support amphibious operations, as were the Iowa class BB's that were being built at the time).

What they missed was the drydocks, machine shops, command and control facilities, and other support infrastructure that would have taken much longer to repair. But most of all, they missed the entire operational and strategic fuel supply for the Pacific fleet. Which if it had been destroyed would have taken at least two years to re-establish. And then it would have had to been shipped in because there wasn't (and still isn't) a pipeline that can supply the islands. And to increase the time, you patrol the area between Hawaii and the Mainland with subs and take out as many tankers (in concert with the Germans on the Atlantic side) as you can. Now you force the Americans to make the decision as to whether to build transports or tankers. Meanwhile all those big, fuel hungry battleships and carriers have to transit the same area to get fueled. Or sit in the harbor and rust.

That said, they really blew it when they failed to catch the Enterprise, Hornet, Lexington or Yorktown in Pearl. A fact that came back to haunt them at Midway.

[neevel]

On a smaller scale, the Force Z Operation-- sending HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse to Malaysia when war with Japan was imminent. Churchill apparently had in mind how the Bismark had caused the whole of the Home Fleet to go apes**t, and figured that having the two ships there could have the same effect on the Japanese. Unfortunately, he apparently didn't take the lesson from the fact that the Bismarck, without air cover, was hunted down and sunk in fairly short order. With Japanese naval aviation being in a much better state than its British counterpart, P.o.W. and Repulse were sent to the bottom soon after leaving port when hostilities commenced.

Churchill seemed to have a knack for questionable strategic ideas-- the invasion of the Dardanelles in WWI was his baby and nearly ended his career, and he maintained his notion throughout WWII that fighting up through the mountainous terrain of central Italy and the Alps somehow represented "the soft underbelly of Europe" (the Italian army was weak, but it was the Germans who were doing the fighting). Oh, and add Gen. John Lucas not sending his forces further inland the days following the Anzio landings to the list of blunders. The landing caught the Germans unprepared and well south of Anzio-- if he'd moved a bit further inland to take road junctures in the Alban hills he could've cut off the German forces and left almost nothing between him and Rome. Instead, he cautiously stayed near the beachhead, letting the Germans move up into the high ground above Anzio and bottle up the Allies. It ended up taking about a half-year of costly fighting to get to Rome.

BTW, Mergs, if you haven't already, go have some fun wasting time at www.combinedfleet.com -- lots of good stuff there on the IJN, the Pacific War, and warships.

Even if the IJN had done everything right at Pearl and Midway, it almost certainly would only have lengthened the war, not changed the final outcome. The whole Japanese strategy was based on the idea that the U.S. would lose morale after a few defeats and sign a treaty acceding to Japanese control of the western and south Pacific. When that didn't happen, it was only a matter of time for them-- they had neither the industrial base nor the military training systems nor the logistical capabilities to sustain a prolonged war against an opponent like the U.S. The U.S. didn't _have_ to choose between building transports or tankers; it had the capacity to do both in sufficient numbers to defeat the Japan. U.S. shipyards put more tonnage of merchant ships in the water in '42 alone than the Japanese did during the entire war. The U.S. Navy that swept away the IJN would have been built by '44 regardless of what might have happened in '41 and '42. And that Pacific Fleet was produced with a minority share of the U.S. warmaking potential-- the bulk of U.S. resources were directed towards Europe and the Mediterranean.

The Japanese never really accepted the idea of attacking shipping with subs-- they were fixated on the notion of using them to go after warships in order to whittle down the enemy in preparation for their 'Decisive Battle' which would settle the war in a day. Sinking cargo ships and tankers didn't fit into their notions of what "warriors" should be doing to win a quick victory in combat.

Overall, I'd mark down the entire concept of Japan making war on the U.S. as a blunder. Except for some people in the navy like Yamamoto, the top Japanese leadership in the late '30's and '40's were largely clueless (or at least in denial) about what a major war with the U.S. would be like, and assumed that just because the American government and media weren't in the habit of spouting streams of "Bushido Warrior Spirit Beats All" jingoism, Americans had no will or ability to fight. It was folly, egged on by an internal need to 'save face' in diplomatic wrangling over China and the opportunistic impulse to grab the colonies of European countries that had fallen to Hitler.

-Dave

[Mergs]

Dave,

All good points. And I agree with you on Churchill and about Anzio. As for the other, yes I am looking at the strategy from a western point of view. The Japanese were still somewhat Napoleonic in their view of attacking and defeating the enemy forces in detail and not going after the enemy's capacity to support the war effort. If, and yes we can "what-if" till the world looks flat, they had taken the same tack as the Germans and conducted a vigorous sub campaign against the west coast shipping, the results, although not substantially changed may have made some difference (that is changed the outcome of the war). The westcoast, and after 1943, the Gulf coast, were able to produce a tremendous amount of shipping because there was no viable threat as there was on the eastcoast. But, as you said, the biggest mistake Japan made was going to war with the US in the first place. They should have been happy to just sit on what they had in the PACRIM and consolidate.

I find it interesting to see how they took the same basic approach economically, but don't have the ability to maintain it.

Here's another blunder that is near and dear to mine and most Texan's hearts. LTG Mark Clark's sending the 36th Division to do an unsupported river crossing over the Rapido River. Not only was it one of the most poorly thought out operations, but it chose to attack from the exact direction and location that the Italian War College had conducted training/evaluations/classes over for almost 100 years! It destroyed the 36th and after that, because of all the replacements that had to come in to replace the almost 40% of casualties, it was no longer mainly Texans. Yes, attrition would have eventually done the same thing, but it destroyed the male populations of many small Texas and Oklahoma towns.

This points up where one of the strength of National Guard units lies as well as one of its weaknesses. Guardsmen generally grow up together and are with each other for many years, so they know intimately the abilities of their peers. But when something like Rapido comes along, or a SCUD hits a warehouse in Dahran, it wipes out a large portion of a town's population.

That one action was so devastating there was talk of putting a price on Mark Clark's head if he should ever step foot in Texas! And even to this day whenever the 49th Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard, does a staff exercise the enemy commander is invariably related to Mark Clark. Either that or Santa Ana. And someone even tried to see if there was a geneological connection between the two!

[arcon]

[ 10-19-2001: Message edited by: arcon ]

[arcon]

[ 10-19-2001: Message edited by: arcon ]

[arcon]

[ 10-19-2001: Message edited by: arcon ]

[Mergs]

HMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM, Custer, let's see, Oh yeah! The obscure (at least at that time) cavalry regimental commander (a Colonel, not a General, although he was during the Great Unpleasantness, and still thought he was!) whose widow is responsible for the stories of his greatness as a military "leader" aka publicity manager. See thread posting on super-egos. He fits in the fifth category: All ego, no ability.

Yeah, that's the guy that launched a minor campaign against 10 to one odds without any intelligence about the enemy strength, location, disposition, terrain or campaign plan, let alone any logistics (Hey guys, leave those outdated swords at home, you've got repeaters (so did the "bad guys", along with arrows, lances, knives, sticks, etc.). Then throw in the fact that he splits his meager force in front of the enemy to be defeated in detail. Not that even if he had kept them together it would have made a hill of beans difference.

Other than that, a brilliant military mind.

[arcon]

[ 10-19-2001: Message edited by: arcon ]

[Lumberg]

When Darth Vadar lost to the rebel forces. He had a fully operational Death Star. Like seriously...what was he thinking.

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Lumberg.
"...ahhh, we have sort of a problem here... yeah, you apparently didn't put one of the new cover sheets on your TPS report"

[neevel]

There actually was some intelligence behind the operation that led to Little Big Horn-- but flawed intelligence. The U.S. forces knew the approximate location of the Sioux and had indian scouts with some knowledge of the area, but underestimated the Sioux numbers by a factor of 3 or 4. The U.S. plan was to have 3 separate cavalry columns rendezvous near the presumed location of the Sioux camp before launching the attack. One of the columns was attacked by the Sioux and turned back. Custer, whose troopers were part of another column, ignored an order to proceed to the rendezvous point along a river (which would've helped conceal his forces) and instead used an indian trail. The Sioux spotted his force, and you know the rest...

As for weapons, the cavalry generally did leave their sabres for full-dress uniform only-- standard issue was a Springfield 'trap-door' single-shot, breech loading carbine and a Colt revolver. The Sioux, who weren't limited to what was official army issue, would buy repeating rifles on the open market (and thus often wind up packing more firepower than the soldiers they opposed).

-Dave

[Purple Fencer]

Mergs, I love the detail you're throwing in here. Helps to be an ossifer, huh? (I never got past Sr. Airman when I was in the USAF. There was never a slot open for me to fill)

Another blunder comes to mind from the Zulu wars.

Never mind the typical Euro/American arrogance aimed at any "savage" (Hey guy...you're on THEIR turf. Doh!) and completely underestimating the opposition, I beieve there were two major errors, one logistical and one from inexperience with new weapons in a combat situation.

1) The British were using new breech-loading rifles that permitted a FAR greater rate of fire than muzzle loaders and other firearms in their inventory. The problem was, they didn't realize that by firing so rapidly, the barrells were heating up faster then they were prepared for, and the shell cartridges kept getting stuck in the breech, which greatly impacted their firepower.

2) The supply guys refused to believe the ammo consumption rates and refused to issue much needed ammo for the weapons that WERE working properly, allowing the Zulus to press their advantage.

That's the problem with being a technologically superior force...you forget that primitive does not mean stupid. Happened to the U.S. in 'Nam. Sending wave after wave of B-52's into Hanoi on the same route day after day? Brainless, truly, and airmen died for it.

That's why I never take anyone for granted on the piste, even if I'm up 14-0 in the first round of DE...it's the surest way I know to get killed.


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Sam Signorelli -- I'll be mellow when I'm
DEAD!

[This message has been edited by Purple Fencer (edited 03-13-2001).]

[Cyranox11]

Hi All
Sorry Sam, must disagree. I assume that you are talking about the battle of Isandhlawana.
The major blunder here was tactical. The Brits made the mistake of camping in a position that was NOT capable of being defended (due to the terrain)The individual companies were far too spread out and incapable of supporting one another. Furthermore, the ammunition depots were far too far away from the individual companies and the picquets were far too close too the main camp!
Why was this?
The Brits did not scout the position effectively before making camp and believed the Zulus to be too far away to pose a threat.
In fact, an ENTIRE impi was hiding in a donga (a rivine) and the scouts actually stood above this donga and looked in but failed to see the impi. When the Zulus saw the camp they moved down the donga and surprised the Brits, overwhelming picquets and companies in seconds. Those companies that could formed a hasty fring line but this was outmanouvred and overwhelmed quite quickly! The ammunition was supplied too slowly mainly because the qms did not believe the neeed for ammuntition as they did not realise the size of the zulu attack. They did not realise that a full scale battle was being fought until too late (they were far away from the fighting) when they did start supplying ammo, it did not arrive because the companies were already isolated and cut off from the supplies!
It is true that the rate of fire was so high that gun barrels overheated but most soldiers were already aware of this and were able to take measures to counteract this. It therefore did not contribute to the disaster that befell the 24th Regt.
Days later an understrength company of sick and wounded soldiers in a mission station being used as a hospital/supply depot using the same rifles, but in a prepared defensible position and with plenty of ammunition routed the self same impi!
I would therefore contend that the disater at Isandhlwana occurred because of tactical mistakes and an overly confident command that did not perceive the real threat posed by a Zulu impi until too late. I doubt whether you can call the 24th Regt inexperienced. They had fought in South Africa against the Xhosa in the numerous frontier wars and had extensive experience with the rifles in question. Logistical problems were the result of the tactical mistakes made and the lack of communication caused by the surprise attack made by the Zulu. Furthermore, the war was won by the Brits because they were able to bring their devstating rate of fire to bear on the Zulu in every battle after Isandhlwana! It could be argued that Isandhlwana was lost because the Brits were unable to deliver the necessary rate of fire because of the ammunition crisis compounded by the lack of mutual support due to the poor positioningbof the companies in the camp!

[big poppa]

Back to Custer. he did have two gatling guns which he left behind because he fely they would slow him down chasing indians who did know thet were beibg chased( in fact they were having a pow pow, a party of the faimly sort which means they was going to be a whole lot of people singing , dancing and feasting. Plus he ingored the massive pony trail leading to the village, didn't ckeck out eh size of the village, devided his commmand, could not cooridate his attacks and most import he disobeyed his superior's orders to wait for the rest of the army( his was one of three units). my two cents

[arcon]

[ 10-19-2001: Message edited by: arcon ]

[Mergs]

Ah,yes.

Intelligence Failures and Operational Successes, the only two possible outcomes of a battle.

[Fencing Girlie]

Back to modern day, I heard America accidentally dropped a bomb on its own training site somewhere in the Gulf just two days ago. Apparently killed 8 American and one New Zealand soldiers. Ooooops

They seem to be making a habit of it, they bombed British tanks not too long ago.

And no this isn't an anti-Americans thread so don't all have a go at me. I know everyone makes mistakes!!

[Mergs]

It was yesterday. 5 American, 1 NZ KIA.
The British "tank" incident was during the Gulf War.

It's called fratricide, and is/has been one of the occupational hazards of war for centuries. Not a blunder.

[RC]

How about the surrender of Detroit during the War of 1812? Or the surrender of Singapore during WWII?


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"Etes-vous prets?"
"Oui!"