Who knew . . .

[Araznal]

Piegeonmeister, all of the flaws you identify in Iraq---factionalism, domination of one group by another, interference from neighbouring states, etc--- existed under Saddam as well. Yet Iraq was a stable state by the standards of the region. Why must it suddenly fly apart under pressures which have existed for decades, merely because it is governed in a marginally less autocratic manner?

It's unfortunate, but true. You'll notice just how much more efficient a country is when under a more authoritarian rule. This is why fascism was so popular as a stabalizing force in the 30s, and why the US instituted the Sedition Act (not sure here, were there 2?). Saddam was able to keep the country stable because less freedom leads to less b*tching. Chances are that Iraq will de-stabilize once the US leaves and reverts back to some kind of regime no matter how long we wait.

It would be best if the Arab countries could re-define their borders so they can undo what the Europeans did after WWI. However unrealistic that seems

[pigeonmeister]

Piegeonmeister, all of the flaws you identify in Iraq---factionalism, domination of one group by another, interference from neighbouring states, etc--- existed under Saddam as well. Yet Iraq was a stable state by the standards of the region. Why must it suddenly fly apart under pressures which have existed for decades, merely because it is governed in a marginally less autocratic manner?

That just is plainly not true, in the absence of Saddam you create a power vacuum that is unpredictable to say the least. You also combine it with the legacy of a run down infrastructure and the bitterness Shia and Kurd hold towards Sunni. This has obviously always there but I think we all agree that it never threatened civil war (it might have if supported, but that's another story).

Why must (must is your word) it fly apart under pressures which have existed for decades?

1. I don't remember an uncontrolable tide of sectarian suicide bombings, killing dozens most days, under Saddam. This is not being controled by the best two armies in the world, I see no reason why it will be controled any better (or indeed that the terrorists will decide to stop) when it is up to the Iraqis themselves. This is an entirely new pressure, resulting from the lack of sensible consideration for what to do after Saddam was toppled.

2. We all know that there were practically no foreign jihadists in Iraq under Saddam, there are clearly a lot lot more now. That's a new pressure.

3. I don't think that Iran had the kind of influence in Iraqi domestic politics, its security forces and clerics, that it has now. Syria was not supplying weapons to terrorist either.

4. Less people have electricity, water, jobs than under Saddam. Freedom is a largely an abstract idea that is meaningless if your living standards are intolerable and you get blown up looking for a job.

5. Yet Democracy has created another pressure that had not existed: expectation. With expectation comes hope which when unfulfilled can be a negative factor in social harmony and support for the process. Out of this people withdraw into their own interest groups. In an uncertain time, the certainty of Sharia law is to many appealing.

6. Which leads me to the religious pressures that now exist in Iraq. Obviously people are no more personaly religious now, but the fact is that before there was no expectation for an Islamic state. There is a sizable expectation, amongst a sizable part of the Shia, that a system of government closer to Iran's, rather than America's is realistic and desirable. This is a new factor, entirely unforseen by America and by any standards a new pressure in Iraqi domestic politics. It is a characteristic in the political process and in the insurgency.

7. There were not American troops in Iraq under Saddam. If we accept that many Iraqis see this as a flaw in the political process, we have to view that the presence of foreign troops must be the most obviously new pressure on Iraq. Abu Ghraib is a new pressure on American foreign policy, not to mention how it is perceived in Iraq and the wider region.

I think you are guilty of the ultimate caveat that went with Bush's thinking: That the region was a mess anyway- we could hardly make it worse. Well the fact is that US action has made Iraq much less stable, created new pressures and unleashed old pressures that have resulted in the kind of death toll (amongst Iraqis) that, after telling the world we are helping them, is developing into a sick joke. The whole situation is completely unpredictable, there are no certainties for which policy makers can plan for, nobody knows what kind of Iraq will emerge. The only people laughing are the Iranians, who have just had their biggest threat removed and at the same time been landed a huge role in Iraqi politics (and thus a huge bargaining tool when dealing with America in say nucleur talks). Unmitigated disaster which ever way you look at it. I honestly can't see how anybody could say that there are no new factors in Iraqi politics, given the last 3 years.

[Inquartata]

That just is plainly not true, in the absence of Saddam you create a power vacuum that is unpredictable to say the least.

Not the point, though. My point was that all of the things to which you point as destabilizing factors also existed under Saddam, yet they did not result in chaos or civil war or capture by foreign influences, etc. Power vacuum was not one of those factors...though it would be a valid one if you are now adducing it.

You also combine it with the legacy of a run down infrastructure and the bitterness Shia and Kurd hold towards Sunni. This has obviously always there but I think we all agree that it never threatened civil war (it might have if supported, but that's another story).

This was exactly what I was asking. WHY did it never have the consequences you predict for Iraq under democracy or psuedodemocracy?

1. I don't remember an uncontrolable tide of sectarian suicide bombings, killing dozens most days, under Saddam.

This is an effect of the current situation, though, not a cause of it.

You can certainly say that things have deteriorated. But to say that they have and will continue to do so because of X, Y and Z when X, Y and Z have been there for decades still begs the question of cause...IOW, what is different in the conditions in Iraq now that will prevent it from being a viable state? Not sectarianism, not oppression, not fear, not decrepit
infrastructure---because these are not new...

This is not being controled by the best two armies in the world, I see no reason why it will be controled any better (or indeed that the terrorists will decide to stop) when it is up to the Iraqis themselves. This is an entirely new pressure, resulting from the lack of sensible consideration for what to do after Saddam was toppled.

But this is like a question that many have asked: Why did the forces of dissatisfaction and dissent never give Saddam the trouble they are giving the world's most powerful military? One might equally well have theorized while Saddam was in power that there was no reason to expect conditions to deteriorate if one merely exchanged one "oppressor" for another. Yet clearly they HAVE deteriorated. It happened, ergo it was possible. I would suggest that the answer to your question is equally up in the air, not the foregone conclusion you predict...

2. We all know that there were practically no foreign jihadists in Iraq under Saddam, there are clearly a lot lot more now. That's a new pressure.

I'm not so sure we DO know that there were none before. But I will stipulate that there are certainly a lot more now.

However, given the withdrawal of the US at some future point, the asserted reason for the agitation of the foreigners would be removed. It's the eventual Iraqi-run state we are discussing, no?

( If in fact the purpose of the jihadis in Iraq is what Bush has claimed---a takeover and establishment of an Islamic state as a base for expansionist aspirations---that would be different. But given the current dislike of many Iraqis for the foreigners, I'm not sure they'd flourish there. )

3. I don't think that Iran had the kind of influence in Iraqi domestic politics, its security forces and clerics, that it has now. Syria was not supplying weapons to terrorist either.

Iran has had a lengthy influence, at least on religious matters in the Shia regions. Many of the top shia imams received their religious training in Iran.

AFAIK Syria has been supplying terrorist groups such as Hezbollah for a long time. If you mean in Iraq specifically, I am not sure they are supplying them. Though I am sure that arms merchants both there and in Iran and elsewhere are doing so...

4. Less people have electricity, water, jobs than under Saddam. Freedom is a largely an abstract idea that is meaningless if your living standards are intolerable and you get blown up looking for a job.

Agreed, but still, those things ( and more, like the dearth of basic foods and medicines, which under Saddam were diverted from the populace to favored groups ) were in short supply before the war as well...

5. Yet Democracy has created another pressure that had not existed: expectation. With expectation comes hope which when unfulfilled can be a negative factor in social harmony and support for the process. Out of this people withdraw into their own interest groups. In an uncertain time, the certainty of Sharia law is to many appealing.

I'll grant you this one.

6. Which leads me to the religious pressures that now exist in Iraq. Obviously people are no more personaly religious now, but the fact is that before there was no expectation for an Islamic state. There is a sizable expectation, amongst a sizable part of the Shia, that a system of government closer to Iran's, rather than America's is realistic and desirable. This is a new factor, entirely unforseen by America and by any standards a new pressure in Iraqi domestic politics. It is a characteristic in the political process and in the insurgency.

I'm not sure it's any more likely a prospect now than it was before. Though a secularist, in his latter years Saddam was beginning to use the symbolism and tectics of the Islamists more and more. Cynical use it may have been, but it was still spreading aspects of Islamicism and it was being done by a Party with pretenses to Pan-Arabism...

7. There were not American troops in Iraq under Saddam.

And presumably there will not be any once a functional Iraqi government is established and in control of the nation.

This may be a cause of unrest now, but why in the future, once the US is gone?

I think you are guilty of the ultimate caveat that went with Bush's thinking: That the region was a mess anyway- we could hardly make it worse.

I don't see that this rationale is flawed. The country is certainly no longer a prospective developer of NBC weapons, is it? That strikes me as an improvement over the status quo ante.

Well the fact is that US action has made Iraq much less stable

I simply disagree. The country has been unstable ever since it was first cobbled together by the British out of howling disparate elements on no very logical basis...

The only people laughing are the Iranians, who have just had their biggest threat removed and at the same time been landed a huge role in Iraqi politics (and thus a huge bargaining tool when dealing with America in say nucleur talks).

Then why are they so unhappy about it?

[pigeonmeister]

Either you accept that Iraq has a completely different political landcape now or you don't, fair enough if you don't. I personaly think that the many factors I suggested (some of which you agreed with) have, in the absense of an autocratic regime, produced a profoundly different set of consequences. You only have to look at the composition of the ruling party, the security services and its links to foreign countries to observe this. You can't turn an oppressed majority into a ruling majority, or drop an oppressive minority down to the bottom of the political food change, whilst creating the biggest jihadist conflict in the world, without creating 'a different set of consequences'.

It's like saying that the political lanscape of post apartheid South Africa is no different to pre-aparteid SA because the same internal racial and social pressures exist.

"My point was that all of the things to which you point as destabilizing factors also existed under Saddam, yet they did not result in chaos or civil war or capture by foreign influences, etc. Power vacuum was not one of those factors..."

I think that you have answered your own point.

"Why did the forces of dissatisfaction and dissent never give Saddam the trouble they are giving the world's most powerful military?"

I think you undersestimate the climate of fear that enabled Saddam to rule. There is a different fear now- fear of being randomly caught in a suicide bombing, not fear of your whole family being executed by the state. Look at the composition of the insurgency: it is predominantly Sunni, with an extreemly violent foreign minority. The Sunni were unlikely to revolt against themselves, the foreigners were not there and most of the Shia clerics were in exile in Iran. So that is why they never gave saddam as much trouble. Plus Saddam never let his enemies infiltrate the arms of his authority in the way the Mahdi army have infiltrated the Southern security forces. Plus after the US betrayed the Shia revolts of the early 90's, they (forces of dissatisfaction)were totaly demoralised.

"I'm not so sure we DO know that there were none before. But I will stipulate that there are certainly a lot more now"

I didn't say none. But if you look at conflicts like Aghanistan in the 80's and 90's and chechyna in the 90's, how much have these conflicts contributed to the training of jihadists. America has created an environment, like in Afghanistan, whereby a new generation of jihadist 'veterans' have fought in Iraq and returned home full of new techniques and a sense of achievement. Basically jihadists are getting a new playground to hone their skills. Although America is also honing its counter terrorism strategy, the point is that there are a lot more people with experience of how to effectively bomb a US convoy. The bombers are getting more and more sophisticated. All in all I don't think you can say that the conflict has made anybody safer in the world.

"However, given the withdrawal of the US at some future point, the asserted reason for the agitation of the foreigners would be removed. It's the eventual Iraqi-run state we are discussing, no?"

No, the presense of American troops is not the major cause of sectarian suicide bombers and general ill-feeling between Shia and Sunni. As such
their departure will not 'heal the rift' or abeit the foreign jihadists or Sunni baatists. The foreign jihadists (and many Sunni insurgents) are not just fighting for the removal of US troops, they are fighting to destroy any credible example of a 'US imposed' democratic state. The targets have been Shia civilians, not just US troops, suggesting that this will continue after a US withdrawal. Any future Iraqi state will be so closely linked to US interests, its army using US equipment, its infrastructure rebuilt by US companies, that it will be unlikely to be seen as credible by potential insurgents.

"The purpose of the jihadis in Iraq is what Bush has claimed---a takeover and establishment of an Islamic state as a base for expansionist aspirations---that would be different."

You miss the point. Foreign jihadists do not need popular support to make Iraq chaotic for generations. Also this might be the ambition, but they will settle at stopping Iraq becoming a western style democracy at any cost to the Iraq people. I include dissafected Sunni terrorists in this, as well as foreigners. There is also the fact that the call for an autonomous Shia Islamic state is being made by Iraqis, not foreigners.

The Iranianian government is so multi-layered that elements of the Republican guard could be supplying insurgents either inadvertantly, through Hezzbollah, or without official sanction. That is why Blair has basically accused Iran of supplying the bombs that killed 4 British soldiers near Basra. Iran is the ultimate winner, it is very happy but can't exactly gloat or appear gratefull (publicly) for any US intervention, believe me they are happy.

1. Biggest threat removed.
2. Idea that you regime change by force has been shown to be too ambitious.
3. Ergo no appetite for invasion of Iran (which there had been)
4. Iran gets to negotiate lots of juicy trade agreements with the Shia dominated government, making the relationship even closer than the poltical and clerical influence. Remember that most Shia in the South watch Iranian TV-that's a big influence.
5. Ergo in nuclear and economic negotiations Iran has the trump card in its abilty to control percpetion in Iraq. An example was that the recent anti-British demonstrations in the South were caused by an Iranian satellite channel falsly accusing British troops of shoting dead Shia pilgrims.


"The country is certainly no longer a prospective developer of NBC weapons"

Dangerous territory here, but even if we accept that Saddam was developing WMD. At what price has he been 'disarmed' in terms of the global nuclear picture. Why was there a differnent strategy in Iraq, rather than N Korea or Iran? Why was Saddam the priority? I'm thinking politicised evidence and the fact that most American were willing to believe he was involved in 9/11 and could deploy WMD in 45 minutes.

If you genuinly think that Iraq is more stable (for Iraqis) now than under Saddam then we are going to have to agree to disagree.

[L.O.A.S.]

Iran is the ultimate winner, it is very happy but can't exactly gloat or appear gratefull (publicly) for any US intervention, believe me they are happy.

1. Biggest threat removed.

I'd say Iran's biggest threat (US) has set up shop with 140K+ troops (best in the world I might add) right next door. With 100 Iraqi Bns becoming more capable by the day, our troops will be looking for other places to see, people to free and enlighten.

2. Idea that you regime change by force has been shown to be too ambitious.

I'd be satisfied with the current regime in place, once we destroy all their military hardware and nuclear capability.

3. Ergo no appetite for invasion of Iran (which there had been)

Precision missle strikes.

4. Iran gets to negotiate lots of juicy trade agreements with the Shia dominated government, making the relationship even closer than the poltical and clerical influence. Remember that most Shia in the South watch Iranian TV-that's a big influence.

We'll have to put our hope in Sir David Frost and his ability to sway the populace to the west.

5. Ergo in nuclear and economic negotiations Iran has the trump card in its abilty to control percpetion in Iraq. An example was that the recent anti-British demonstrations in the South were caused by an Iranian satellite channel falsly accusing British troops of shoting dead Shia pilgrims.

Precision missle strike.

If you genuinly think that Iraq is more stable (for Iraqis) now than under Saddam then we are going to have to agree to disagree.

For the majority of the country, yes.

[Inquartata]

I personaly think that the many factors I suggested (some of which you agreed with) have, in the absense of an autocratic regime, produced a profoundly different set of consequences.

Cetainly, but it did not seem to me that you were simply arguing that the present situation generally is different from that of the past. That of course is so obvious as to need no mention. What I took it that you were arguing was that the future situation was almost inevitably going to be X, based on factors A, B and C...even though A, B and C have been operative in Iraq for decades...

I think that you have answered your own point.

If so, I do not see it...

I think you undersestimate the climate of fear that enabled Saddam to rule. There is a different fear now- fear of being randomly caught in a suicide bombing, not fear of your whole family being executed by the state.

Again, though, we are not talking about what IS, but rather about what may or will be.

Given the history of political control in the region, one suspects that this repressive climate will be swiftly reestablished once the palliative influence of the US and its allies is removed and the Iraqis are in control of their own policies. Should the terrorism continue then, I envision the emergence of an Egyptian-style response.

Moreover, I do not see that the tactics of the terrorists have changed very much from those of the Saddam era. People are still threatened with murder or worse, and yes, with reprisals against their families, if they vote/cooperate with the new government/don't leave the neighborhood/don't do whatever else the terrorists tell them to do. Many of the marauding groups---I will not dignify them with terms like "resistance" or "insurgency"---most likely consist of and are led by members of the old Baath power elite anyway. One can scarcely expect more noble tactics from the likes of these than those they were wont to use before. The only difference I can see is that now they are forced to use them semi-surreptitiously, or at least unofficially...

Look at the composition of the insurgency: it is predominantly Sunni, with an extreemly violent foreign minority.

Yes, and that's an oddity in itself, is it not? Generally speaking the Shia have been far more likely to indulge in terrorism and violence for political ends than have the Sunni, around the Arab world. It puzzles me why the former, though a majority, were so docile under the old regime.

With the current Sunni groups, however, we see something of a difference. Apparently many of them are little more than criminal gangs, engaging in kidnappings, blackmail, intimidation and robbery for profit rather than politics...though most at least seem to be trying to cloak their depredations in nationalism and Islamism. ( With nearly universal success, if one can believe the media, which continues to lump them all together in its reports. )

The Sunni were unlikely to revolt against themselves, the foreigners were not there and most of the Shia clerics were in exile in Iran.

I do not think that this can begin to explain the tameness of the Shia in Iraq under Saddam. The precise conditions have not prevented violent uprisings and ongoing guerilla warfare by Shia populations in other countries, such as Iran and Lebanon...

So that is why they never gave saddam as much trouble. Plus Saddam never let his enemies infiltrate the arms of his authority in the way the Mahdi army have infiltrated the Southern security forces. Plus after the US betrayed the Shia revolts of the early 90's, they (forces of dissatisfaction)were totaly demoralised.

Again, I do not think these conditions were much different than those under the Shah in Iran. Yet we saw no cowed complaisance there.

But if you look at conflicts like Aghanistan in the 80's and 90's and chechyna in the 90's, how much have these conflicts contributed to the training of jihadists. America has created an environment, like in Afghanistan, whereby a new generation of jihadist 'veterans' have fought in Iraq and returned home full of new techniques and a sense of achievement.

I think this training-and-recruitment card is very much overplayed. Moreover, if one accepts this logic one is left with only one alternative to fighting the terrorists: capitualtion. If resistance can only "worsen" the problem, what else is there but to accede to their every wish and demand?

I do not accept that logic. I think that terrorists should be extirpated. If the extirpation recruits and trains more, those should be killed, too. The supply of angry, deluded young Arab men is not inexhaustible. And if Iraq is now a breeding ground for jihadists, it is also a killing field for them. The effort will be far from costless, but that does not mean that it is not worth making it. This is the only viable solution I can see. These groups offer us nothing but eternal enmity and harm, whether we fight them or not. I would rather fight than cower and be attacked anyway. Still less would I care to appease or buy them off.

No, the presense of American troops is not the major cause of sectarian suicide bombers and general ill-feeling between Shia and Sunni.

Really? It's certainly the cause most often cited. At the top of the lungs of crowds, in the videotaped wills of the suicide bombers, of their media organs and of such of their leaders as will speak at all. I have not yet heard an avowal that the Shia are the reason for their armed warfare by any Sunni group, much less by the foreigners.

Shia and Sunni have lived together In Iraq for a long time, and intermarriage and business cooperation is widespread. There are rivalries and grievances being nursed on both sides, but IMO the current lawless state is merely a convenient theatre for the settling of scores, it did not build it and is not the reason why it exists. It exists because the hated Americans are there, because the favored ruling class has been unceremoniously ( and "humiliatingly", which is apparenly all-important in the Arab mind ) cast out of power--not by the Shia, but by the US and its Western allies, and because the foreign groups are financing and fomenting violence against the US because of other quarrels long preceding the Iraq matter.

The reason so many of the attacks are on Shia civilians these days is because Americans are too difficult to get in sufficient numbers to make for heartening press among the masses, IMO.

The foreign jihadists (and many Sunni insurgents) are not just fighting for the removal of US troops, they are fighting to destroy any credible example of a 'US imposed' democratic state.

Indeed they are. But again, they are not popular in Iraq, and once they are seen for what they are---not noble warriors helping Iraq resist the heathen occupier but groups with their own plans for Iraq---the Iraqi people will not long suffer their presence, I do not think. Already there have been attacks on them, and while they may be all but indistinguishable from Iraqis to us the Iraqis themselves have no trouble looking at and listening to a fellow and knowing him for a foreigner. I do not think their meddling will be suffered more agreeably than ours has been, once the common foe is gone.

Foreign jihadists do not need popular support to make Iraq chaotic for generations.

Don't they? Why not? It's not as though they have the numbers to do much against the Iraqis themselves once the latter turn on them. And I fully believe that they WILL turn on them. They have already demonstrated the willingness to do so, and dissatisfaction with their attitudes, activities and indeed presence on a number of occasions.

There is also the fact that the call for an autonomous Shia Islamic state is being made by Iraqis, not foreigners.

Every group has its disaffected minority. I see no compelling reason to accept that their demands will win out.

The Iranianian government is so multi-layered that elements of the Republican guard could be supplying insurgents either inadvertantly, through Hezzbollah, or without official sanction. That is why Blair has basically accused Iran of supplying the bombs that killed 4 British soldiers near Basra.

Yes. But the last intelligence assessment I read was that these are most likely being supplied by criminal gangs, possibly with the pretense to ignorance of Iranian officialdom but probably not at their behest.

Sometimes accusations have political motives. ( Just ask Kim Jong-il. )

Iran is the ultimate winner, it is very happy but can't exactly gloat or appear gratefull (publicly) for any US intervention, believe me they are happy.

With respect, believe you---why? Are you "on the inside"?

1. Biggest threat removed.

By no means. Their biggest threat is either Israel or the United States, depending on what they choose to do. Moreover, Iraq has not been "removed". If things go according to our plan and Iraq becomes a viable state, its army will be much better trained and equipped than before, and it will have the US as an ally. This IMO is much worse for them than an exhausted, sapped Iraq with a crumbling, decrepit army, an air force all but prohibited to fly and all but incapable of doing so effectively, and the censure and gimlet gaze of the world upon it. ( And now that pressure is on Iran instead. Yes, they must be simply ecstatic. )

2. Idea that you regime change by force has been shown to be too ambitious.

Again, by no means. The regime was changed without much difficulty at all. It's only in maintaining control that problems have been shown to be enormous. I scarcely think that the mullahs of Iran can be much comforted by the prospect that Iran might be hard to hold onto after their precious carcasses are in prison or the grave...in the end, all politics are personal.

3. Ergo no appetite for invasion of Iran (which there had been)

What, twenty years ago? Certainly not recently. Iraq had a generation of its youth all but wiped out by a long, slogging war that accomplished precisely nothing for them. Absent Saddam eveloping nuclear weapons I do not think that Iraq was a threat to any country much stronger than Kuwait...

4. Iran gets to negotiate lots of juicy trade agreements with the Shia dominated government, making the relationship even closer than the poltical and clerical influence. Remember that most Shia in the South watch Iranian TV-that's a big influence.

No doubt. But does anyone really think that the mullahs are motivated by trade concerns?

5. Ergo in nuclear and economic negotiations Iran has the trump card in its abilty to control percpetion in Iraq. An example was that the recent anti-British demonstrations in the South were caused by an Iranian satellite channel falsly accusing British troops of shoting dead Shia pilgrims.

Sorry, you've lost me on this one...

Why was there a differnent strategy in Iraq, rather than N Korea or Iran? Why was Saddam the priority?

That's another debate altogether, really. The reasons are complex, numerous and not amenable to simple analysis. At least, if they are anything like the reasons for anything else in human affairs, much less international politics.

If you genuinly think that Iraq is more stable (for Iraqis) now than under Saddam then we are going to have to agree to disagree.

Again, it is the FUTURE which matters, not the present. The fact that a hurricane sweeps through Louisiana and Mississippi does not establish that things are going to be flooded and damaged forever thereafter. Present turbulence does not guarantee future turbulence.

[telkanuru]

Wow... I... I've never actually delved this deep into my inner pit of not caring... A political thread I can't be bothered to read. Amazing.

[pigeonmeister]

1.Given the history of political control in the region, one suspects that this repressive climate will be swiftly reestablished once the palliative influence of the US and its allies is removed and the Iraqis are in control of their own policies. Should the terrorism continue then, I envision the emergence of an Egyptian-style response.

2. Moreover, I do not see that the tactics of the terrorists have changed very much from those of the Saddam era. People are still threatened with murder or worse, and yes, with reprisals against their families, if they vote/cooperate with the new government/don't leave the neighborhood/don't do whatever else the terrorists tell them to do. Many of the marauding groups---I will not dignify them with terms like "resistance" or "insurgency"---most likely consist of and are led by members of the old Baath power elite anyway. One can scarcely expect more noble tactics from the likes of these than those they were wont to use before. The only difference I can see is that now they are forced to use them semi-surreptitiously, or at least unofficially...


3. With the current Sunni groups, however, we see something of a difference. Apparently many of them are little more than criminal gangs, engaging in kidnappings, blackmail, intimidation and robbery for profit rather than politics...though most at least seem to be trying to cloak their depredations in nationalism and Islamism. ( With nearly universal success, if one can believe the media, which continues to lump them all together in its reports. )


4. I think this training-and-recruitment card is very much overplayed. Moreover, if one accepts this logic one is left with only one alternative to fighting the terrorists: capitualtion.

5. The supply of angry, deluded young Arab men is not inexhaustible. And if Iraq is now a breeding ground for jihadists, it is also a killing field for them.


6. Really? It's certainly the cause most often cited. At the top of the lungs of crowds, in the videotaped wills of the suicide bombers, of their media organs and of such of their leaders as will speak at all. I have not yet heard an avowal that the Shia are the reason for their armed warfare by any Sunni group, much less by the foreigners.

7. Shia and Sunni have lived together In Iraq for a long time, and intermarriage and business cooperation is widespread.

8. Yes. But the last intelligence assessment I read was that these are most likely being supplied by criminal gangs, possibly with the pretense to ignorance of Iranian officialdom but probably not at their behest.


9. By no means. Their biggest threat is either Israel or the United States, depending on what they choose to do. Moreover, Iraq has not been "removed". If things go according to our plan and Iraq becomes a viable state, its army will be much better trained and equipped than before, and it will have the US as an ally. This IMO is much worse for them than an exhausted, sapped Iraq with a crumbling, decrepit army, an air force all but prohibited to fly and all but incapable of doing so effectively, and the censure and gimlet gaze of the world upon it. ( And now that pressure is on Iran instead. Yes, they must be simply ecstatic. )

10. No doubt. But does anyone really think that the mullahs are motivated by trade concerns?


11. Sorry, you've lost me on this one...

1. There is no 'history' that is relevant to post-occupied Iraq. It was a historical first. On what basis can you predict an Egyptian type response? A repressive regime might well emerge but it will have to deal with a whole set of circumstances, entirely different to Egypt (which lets be honest was never threatened by civil war or sectarian suicide bombers on a daily basis) Even if an Egyptian style state did emerge, it would hardly be a cause for celebration.

2. You don't see the difference between state sponsored terror tactics to oppress the Kurd and Shia, and a climate whereby non Iraqi jihadists are trying to provoke a sectarian civil war to defeat a political process? Yes they were equally cruel, but Saddam wasn't trying to engage the Shia with Sunni and Kurd. Now we are in a situation where Shia, Sunni and Kurd need to cooperate, NOT be kicked into submission. It is this completely different environment that changes the political effects of terror in Iraq. You can't say that because a few Shia took pot shots at Saddam that is the same as an Iranian backed Shia militia trying to establish a theocratic Islamic state in the south. This just wasn't happening under Saddam, even if the sectarian conflict, and political ambitions were there, the situation where they could become a potent force was not. In terms of tactics, I think that yes terror has the universal aim or terrorising people. This aim Saddam and Bin Laden shared, but there tactics and political motivations are completely different.

3. Proof? Again Rumsfield, since day 1, has characterised the Sunni terrorists as common criminals only interested in money. Obviously being terrorists they are criminals, but they have an aim beyond money. That is that the Sunni recognise that they are going to be hated by Shia and believe that any constitution will be tailor made to benefit the Shia and Kurd. As such they want to see it fail, provoking a civil war is a way of showing America has failed. The Jihadists have no real interest in coming to Iraq for economic reasons.

4. No the point is that the Bush idea that Iraq could become a honey trap in which terrorists could be inticed and then slaughtered is a) Irresponsible to Iraqis b) Not actually successfull. Like it or not Bin Laden was shaped by the conflict in Afghanistan, there is every reason to believe that the increasingly sophisticated bombing techniques will filter down the global terror network. Essentially America has created a jihadist play ground where there was never one before.

5. Yes there is and that is the problem. Trying to eliminate every communist in Vietnam didn't work, trying to eliminate every terrorist in Northern Ireland didn't work. Trying to kill every terrorist in Gaza isn't working. You can't kill everyone, as the situation is self-perpetuating. You can't reconcile a determination to destroy terrorism that is often indivisible from the populace, with the kind of hearts and minds operations you need to win over the population. Otherwise America will be killing terrorists in Iraq in 100 years time. It's not going to be: yep we got the last one- we can go now.

6. The situation is a sectarian civil war between Shia and Sunni, based on their differnet visions for the future and the historical bitterness they share. None of this is related to America's presense. It is the constitution they are rejecting. if America leaves the constitution will be no more legitmate in the Sunni's eyes.

7. I'm sure your an expert of the inter marriages of Iraq, but the point must be that they are physically, economically (in terms of resources), emotionaly and politically seperated. This is represented in their very differnent visions for the future, this doesn't mean in some areas they get on famously. Are there many Shia-Sunni marriages in Najaf or Falluja?

8. I think that the trail leads to elements of the Republican Guard, this was not official obviously but bare in mind that Iran's President used to command the R G. I stil agree with you though.

9. America and Israel are global ememies of Iran. That is the mistake Bush made in the Middle East. All the various leaders care much more about domestic and regional politics than global. In this sense Saddam always wanted to be America's friend, he bigged up his WMD threat to shore up his domestic position and scare Iran and other neighbours. By the time Saddam said 'Actually it was all bull****' it was too late. He is to blame for tricking the world into think he had serious WMD- but it wasn't to scare the Americans. Remember that Iran and Iraq never signed a peace treaty, and that war slaughtered 100,000's. It was all about being top dog in the region. The old Iraq was an enemy to Iran, the new Iraq is practically a bed fellow- how is that bad for Iran?

What pressure is on Iran?

1. Invasion is now not an option.
2. Missile strikes not really an option- this isn't like the 1981 bombing of Iraqs reactor. That was one reactor well known and poorly defended, it removal removed the threat immediately. The Iranians have sadly learned from this, Nobody knows which of the many sites need hitting, many are deep underground, the Iranians can easily move about and rebuild facilities, intelligence on Iranian WMD is worse than it was on Iraq (and that was pretty awful). It would not have international support, even Jack Straw has said bombing will be 'inconceiveable'. Iran would rebuild in even more secret underground areas, we would have to maintain the kind of intelligence-led precision bombng that America (or Israel) is not capable of. And we would have to do it every month for ever and ever.
3. Can't even take Iran to security council cos China and Russia are happily negotiating huge Gas and Oil contracts with Iran.
4. American economic sanctions already exist.
5. Any strikes on Iran would be met with outcry in Shia dominated Iraq- pushing the Americans further away from its goal of US friendly Iraq.
6. Iran legally has the right to nuclear power, it is up to America to prove that this would be a cover for an arms programme- can it?

10. You would be surprised, the Iranians (and the Ayatollah) are some of the most pragmatic people in the world. Why else would they allow Israel to use its airspace to attack Iraq. Why else keep hinting to the EU that econmic sweeteners are the only thing that will make them listen.

11. What I mean is that Iran has the power to whip up the Shia in Iraq, the person keeping the Shia back from civil war (Sistani) is Iranian. Iranian agents have infiltrated all arms of the government. Iranian news coverage is a powerfull tool. Can you not see how this is a useful bargaining tool in the realpolitik world of nuclear negotiations?